The VietNam Veterans Memorial Wall Message Board

Attleboro
. . Contributed By bill hart On Monday, March 24, 2003
// The stage was now set for Operation ATTLEBORO. / ATTLEBORO was to be a search and destroy operation conducted by the / 196th Light Infantry Brigade in an area generally described as a / rectangle twenty kilometers wide by sixty kilometers long located east / and north of Tay Ninh city. (Map 4) The operation was initiated by the / 196th on 14 September 1966 with the airmobile assault of a single / battalion followed by a search and destroy operation of but a few days / in which only two significant contacts with the enemy were made. After / the initial assault battalion was committed elsewhere, another / battalion of the 196th continued the mission from 18 to 24 September; / it made no significant contact. It, too, was diverted to another area / but returned to ATTLEBORO on 6 October and conducted search and / destroy operations for ten more days. During this time the battalion / destroyed tunnel complexes, trenches, and fighting positions and / captured two tons of rice, many documents, and some enemy arms. It was / not until mid-October, as the result of a decision taken at the / Military Assistance Command commanders' conference, that ATTLEBORO was / expanded to a multibattalion operation with the 196th committing two / battalions to its search and destroy activities. Through the end of / October action was light and sporadic with no major contact. In fact, / the action was so light that between 4 October and 1 November only two / immediate air strikes were called in to support the operation. / Meanwhile, the Viet Cong 9th Division was starting to stir again. / After its beating in EL PASO II in June and July 1966, the 9th / had withdrawn to its sanctuaries deep in War Zone C next to the / Cambodian border and had retrained, re-equipped, and absorbed / replacements. The plan of the 9th was to use these bases to launch a / winter offensive against objectives in Tay Ninh Province. Among its / objectives was to be the Special Forces camp at Suoi Da, located / twelve kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh city in the shadow of Nui Ba / Den, the Black Virgin Mountain, which rose, as if by mistake, some / three thousand feet above the surrounding plain. The division also / hoped to lure some allied forces into the area in response to an / attack by one of its regiments so that these forces might be ambushed / by the remaining regiments of the 9th. By late October the regiments / assigned to the 9th Viet Cong Division- the 271st, 272d, 273d, and the / 101st North Vietnamese Regiment- had commenced deploying in War Zone / C. On 28 October elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division made / contact with a battalion of the 273d just east of the ATTLEBORO / operational area. The commanding officer of one of the companies of / the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment, captured on 8 November, / revealed that his regiment had left its base area on the Cambodian / border about 1 November to move south along the eastern boundary of / the ATTLEBORO area toward resupply camps. / Sweeping operations by American units near Dau Tieng on 31 October / uncovered a major enemy supply base. On 1 November ATTLEBORO became a / brigade-size operation with the 196th Brigade assuming operational / control of a battalion from the 25th Division. Two days later an / airmobile assault by this battalion made contact with elements of the / 9th Viet Cong Division; on the same day, 3 November, elements of the / U.S. 5th Special Forces Group's mobile strike force, which had been / inserted into landing zones near Suoi Da, were also engaged by forces / of the 9th Division. Operation ATTLEBORO was about to erupt. / By 5 November it was apparent that a very large enemy force was / involved; operational control was initially passed to Major General / William E. DePuy, Commanding General, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and / subsequently to the commanding general of II Field Force. Before the / operation ended on 24 November, the 1st Division, elements of the U.S. / 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and / several South Vietnamese Army battalions were committed to it, over / 22,000 U.S. and allied troops in all. It was the largest U.S. / operation of the war to that time. / It was not only the number of U.S. and allied troops eventually / involved which made ATTLEBORO a large operation. There was also during / November a total of over 1,600 close air support sorties flown, / expending nearly 12,000 tons of ordnance (225 were B-52 / sorties carrying 4,000 tons). Cargo aircraft flew 3,300 sorties in / transporting 8,900 tons of cargo and 11,500 passengers during the / period 18 October-26 November. The enemy left 1,106 dead on the / battlefield and had 44 captured. (Friendly losses were 155 killed and / 494 wounded.) Later military intelligence reports confirmed the high / casualties sustained by the enemy, listing 2,130 killed- including / over 1,000 by air strikes, almost 900 wounded, and over 200 missing or / captured. Headquarters of the Central Office of South Vietnam was / reported struck by B-52 bombers on more than one occasion with the / destruction of great quantities of supplies, equipment, and documents. / Four Viet Cong battalion commanders and 5 company commanders were / reported killed in the operation. / Not only would its casualities pose a serious problem to the Viet Cong / 9th Division, so too would the pillaging of its depot area by U.S. and / South Vietnamese forces. Over 2,000 tons of rice were captured, as / were many tons of salt, 19,000 grenades, 500 claymore mines, and many / individual and crew-served weapons. Uncovered and destroyed were / regimental and battalion headquarters sites, a mine factory, and a / vast tunnel complex containing immense quantities of supplies ranging / from bolts of cloth to weighing scales. As General DePuy commented, / "It is the largest haul we've made." / Hurting from the whipping it had taken, the 9th Division once again / disappeared into its sanctuaries to lick its wounds, regroup, and / reorganize. It would not be seen on the field of combat again until / the spring of 1967. / Operation ATTLEBORO introduced the large-scale, multiorganization / operation to the war, albeit as an accident, in response to the Viet / Cong 9th Division's Tay Ninh campaign. But ATTLEBORO proved that, / within a matter of hours, well-trained and profes-sionally led / organizations with proper logistic support could deploy large numbers / of battalions to an active operational area and commit those / battalions to immediate combat against a highly disciplined enemy. It / proved that large-scale operations, perhaps involving the majority of / the forces available in corps zone, have a place in modern / counterinsurgency warfare and can effectively destroy large enemy / forces and equipment and neutralize major base areas. However, the / next time such large forces were used in a single operation, it would / not be by accident, as CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY were soon to / verify. / / / D-Day, 22 February 1967 / On D-day the operation order was implemented as envisaged. Nine / infantry battalions conducted air assaults (eight airmobile, one / parachute) to cordon the entire northern portion of the objective / area. At the same time, the 25th Division adjusted its one brigade in / blocking positions on the west while positioning additional units for / the attack into the horseshoe; the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, pushed- / north up Provincial Route 4 to complete the horseshoe. / The 1st Brigade, 1st Division, initiated the airmobile operations from / Minh Thanh with one battalion making an airmobile assault at 0813 into / a landing zone north of Route 246 and only 1,600 meters south of the / Cambodian border. Sporadic small arms fire was encountered from the / southern portion of the landing zone; however, the zone was quickly / secured. The other two battalions of the brigade air assaulted into / LZ's to the west of the first battalion at 1130 and 1630. They were / unopposed. / Earlier that day, 845 paratroopers had boarded sixteen C-130's at Bien / Hoa and at 0900 the 173d Airborne Brigade began its combat jump. As / the aircraft approached the drop zone (three kilometers north of / Katum), the jumpmaster's voice rose above the roar of the C-130: / "Stand in the Door." General Deane moved to the right door; taking his / position in the left door was Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Sigholtz, / commander of the airborne task force composed of the 2d Battalion, / 503d Infantry; A Battery, ad Battalion, 319th Artillery; and elements / of the 173d Brigade headquarters and headquarters company. As the / green light flashed "go," General Deane jumped, leading the first U.S. / combat parachute assault since the Korean War. There was no enemy / contact during the jump. / (Chief Warrant Officer Howard P. Melvin of San Francisco, California, / then 53 years old, was participating in his fifth combat parachute / assault over a period of some twenty years. His previous four were / Gela, Sicily, Salerno, and St. Mere Eglise.) / By 0920 all companies had established command posts. A heavy equipment / drop commenced at 0925 and continued periodically / throughout the day. By 1230 the battalion command post was / estab-lished. There had been only eleven minor injuries as a result of / the jump. / Almost simultaneously with the airborne assault, the 196th Brigade of / the 25th Division began airmobile assaults in the vicinity of Route / 246 along the northwestern portion of the horse-shoe. By 1350 all / three battalions had completed their assaults unopposed. / The northeastern portion of the inverted U was completed by the two / other battalions of the 173d Brigade, then at Quan Loi, making their / airmobile assaults into four landing zones, three north and one south / of Katum. / Ground elements for the operation had started rolling at 0630 on D-day / as the 1st Division's 3d Brigade entered the action. While an infantry / battalion remained in Suoi Da, other forces of the brigade attacked / north along Route 4 from Artillery Base I at the "French Fort." / Following the attacking force, the mechanized infantry battalion moved / into defensive positions at planned artillery bases near Prek Klok and / three kilometers to the north. / Artillery for the bases was in the column and was dropped off as the / column came to the appropriate fire base. In the column was also the / armored company of the 173d Brigade which would revert to the / brigade's control upon linkup. Although there were temporay delays in / getting the column pushed through caused by mines, road repair, and / the need to bridge some streams, the 1inkup with elements of the 173d / just south of Katum occurred at 1500.1 The division engineer elements / in the column had had a busy day in making Route 4 passable and in / launching three AVLB's over streams. / The 2d Brigade, 25th Division, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment / (-) moved to positions near the open (south) end of the horseshoe and / poised for their attack to the north in the morning. The remaining / brigade under the 25th Division continued search and destroy / operations east of Route 22 and north of Trai Bi. / Eighteen battalions, organized into six brigades, and one cavalry / regiment were now deployed around the horseshoe. Thirteen mutually / supporting fire support bases also ringed the operational area. / Throughout the day enemy contact and casualties remained light with / four Americans killed and twenty-three wounded; enemy losses were / unknown. The Air Force had also had a busy day, having flown 216 / preplanned strike sorties in direct support of the ground operation. / D Plus 1, 23 February / The combined elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) and the / 2d Brigade of the 25th Division thrust northward through the open end / of the horseshoe to trap the Viet Cong and locate and destroy COSVN / and North Vietnamese Army-Viet Cong installations. The units / immediately began to uncover significant caches of enemy supplies and / equipment. Only four minor contacts, however, were made during the / day's search. / Around the horseshoe the units continued to improve their defensive / positions, to secure routes in their areas, and to conduct search and / destroy operations. Contact remained light. One sig- / 1When I landed at the 173d Brigade command post in late morning to / make final coordination for the linkup of the 3d Brigade column, I was / interested to observe both the sense of euphoria and the lassitude / which obviously had enveloped many of the jumpers I saw. The former / feeling, I understand, resulted from the jump having been most / successful; the latter, I suspect, came as the aftermath to the severe / jolt of adrenalin most of the jumpers must have received as they / contemplated their first jump in months being made into a potentially / "hot" drop zone located only four kilometers from the Cambodian / border. Small wonder their glands were functioning! / / nificant find in the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, area was a / battalion-size base camp complete with shower facilities and over / 6,000 pairs of "Ho Chi Minh" sandals (made from worn-out truck tires). / The infantry battalion of the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, which had / remained at Suoi Da, air assaulted into a landing zone near Route 4, / three kilometers southwest of Katum. Another infantry battalion from / Minh Thanh replaced it at Suoi Da. Task Force ALPHA consisting of the / 1st and 5th South Vietnamese Marine Battalions was airlifted from / Saigon to Trai Bi and was attached to the 25th Division. Engineers / continued to improve Route 4 and started the construction of a timber / trestle bridge about four kilometers south of Katum. Tactical air / strikes for the day numbered 175. / D Plus 2, 24 February / General Seaman sent a message to the commanding generals of the 1st / and 25th Divisions congratulating them on the speed / and professionalism displayed during the placement of the cordon in / western War Zone C. He concluded by saying ". . I want a thorough / search to be made of areas of responsibility. . I particularly / desire that western War Zone C be completely cov-ered." Just as a / similar one sent in CEDAR FALLS had done, General Seaman's message was / to set the tone for JUNCTION CITY for the next twenty-one days. / On 24 February Task Force ALPHA conducted an airmobile assault into a / landing zone secured by the 196th Brigade at the northern end of its / area of responsibility near the Cambodian border; the South Vietnamese / marines attacked south within the zone and prepared to continue / operations farther to the south. The infantry battalion of the 3d / Brigade, 1st Division, which was at Suoi Da, moved to field positions / six kilometers south of Prek Klok along Route 4. / The hammer forces of the 25th Division continued the attack to the / north. The other II Field Force units on the horseshoe strengthened / further their defensive blocking positions and continued / search and destroy operations. The engineers continued to improve the / road network and started to clear the jungle up to seventy-five yards / from the sides of Route 4. Construction of the airfield at Katum also / commenced. / Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day and into the / night; however, six enemy base camps were located and destroyed. The / bases contained a significant number of weapons, ammunition, rice, and / miscellaneous supplies of all types, "from fish-sauce to dynamite." It / was on this day that a series of base camps in an area three / kilometers south of the Cambodian border began to be uncovered by one / of the battalions of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division; and they had to / fight their way in. It appeared that the camps were part of the / military affairs section of the Central Office of South Vietnam. There / were large mess facilities, lecture halls, recreational areas, and / supply depots. Among some of the unusual items found in them were over / 30 excellent portable tran-sistor radios made in Japan, over 4,500 / batteries for such radios, reams of paper, 700 pencils, 500 ball-point / pens, 1,750 erasers, a new Briggs and Stratton 3-hp. engine and / generator, shower points, and ping-pong tables. A visit to one of / these base camps revealed large underground living quarters and big, / heavily built defensive positions. Above ground were some sleeping / quarters and cooking areas with roofs made of leaves so they could not / be seen through the jungle canopy. In one of these cooking facilities / was a calendar pad nailed to a roof support. The date exposed was 23 / February, the day U.S. forces first entered the general area of the / base camps. The occupants had departed in a hurry, leaving behind food / par-tially prepared in the kitchens as well as their livestock and / chickens. / By the end of the third day of the operation, all was still going / according to plan. Forty-two of the enemy had been killed and 1 / prisoner and 4 ralliers taken; U.S. losses were 14 killed and 93 / wounded. / End of Phase I, 25 February-17 March / / During the rest of Phase I (which was officially terminated at / midnight of 17 March) the units of both divisions continued their / meticulous search of the operational area. Since the hammer forces had / completed their operations, the units of the 1st Brigade, 1st / Division, started leaving their portion of the horseshoe as early as 2 / March when one battalion was airlifted to Quan Loi. A second battalion / was lifted the following day to Minh Thanh, and on 4 March the 1st Brigade terminated Phase I. On 3 / March the 1st Engineers completed the Katum airfield;2 the next day / all of the battalion had terminated Phase I and began relocating to / the east-ern edge of War Zone C. (For all intents and purposes the 1st / Brigade of the 1st Division and the 1st Engineer Battalion began Phase / II on 7 March when they started operations west of An Loc along Route / 246 and at the destroyed bridge site where that road crosses the / Saigon River.) / During this 21-day period the action was / marked mainly by contacts with small forces (one to ten men) and the / continual discovery of more and more base camps. Rice, documents, / dried fish, / 2 On 22 February, after twenty-seven days of / labor, D Company of the 1st Engineers had just finished the / construction of a C-130 capable airfield (covered with T17 membrane) / at Suoi Da. Two days later the company was at Katum starting work on / another airfield. Within eight days they cleared 680,000 square feet / of jungle; opened a laterite pit; and graded, crowned, drained, / compacted, and completed the laterite airfield. On 3 March Air Force / Colonels V. W. Froelich of the 315th Air Command Wing and Hugh Wild, / 834th Air Division, flew in by transport and inspected and approved / the field. They hauled out a load of captured rice. / ammunition and explosives, some weapons, and / much communication equipment (including miles of wire) were the / principal items found. Along Route 4 convoy vehicles continued to hit / mines and be harassed by RPG2 antitank weapons and small arms fire. / The two major battles fought during Phase I / occurred at or near Prek Klok on 28 February and 10 March. However, / there were other occurrences and sizable engagements during this / period which are worthy of mention. / On 26 February a company of the 3d Brigade, / 4th Division, west of Route 22, engaged the 3d Battalion, 271st Viet / Cong Regiment, in the latter's base camp. The company was completely / surrounded and another company came to its relief. Eleven enemy were / killed with U.S. losses 5 killed and 19 wounded. / Two days later the 173d Brigade northeast of / Katum found what appeared to be the public information office for / psychological propaganda of the Central Office of South Vietnam. In an / underground photographic laboratory the troopers found 120 reels of / motion picture film, numerous still photographs, and pictures and / busts of Communist leaders. This discovery / proved to be one of the major intelligence coups of the war. / On the following day, 1 March, a battalion of / the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, sweeping in the same general area as / the location of the COSVN military affairs section, found what / appeared to be a school and propaganda center. There were light, / office-type huts, a mess hall, two dispensaries, and sleeping / quarters, but no fighting positions. Among the items taken were a / loudspeaker system com-plete with speakers and amplifiers, material / for making identification cards, and a bag of documents. / On 3 March a company of the 173d Brigade made / contact with an estimated enemy company east of Katum. In an intensive / fire fight in which the enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, and / M79 grenade launchers, and which lasted only thirty minutes, the enemy / lost 39 killed and the U.S. 20 killed and 28 wounded. / On 6 March the 173d Brigade made airmobile / assaults with its three battalions into three landing zones located / one, three, and six kilometers south of Bo Tuc (on Route 246 southeast / of Katum). / The brigade was searching for the COSVN / military intelligence bureau reported to be located south of Bo Tuc. / During the next seven days of search and destroy the battalions made / sporadic con-tact, killing about 40 Viet Cong. / Having completed its participation in the / hammer operation, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) had tuned west / on 26 February to continue search and destroy in the 25th Division's / operational area. On 6 March the two squadrons of the 11th Armored / Cavalry began a sweep along the Cambodian border. The sweep was to / cover a zone extending 1,500 meters from the border and was to start / four kilometers southwest of the point where Route 22 hits the / Cambodian border in the north and was to end at Lo Go. The sweep would / include all the border in the "Little Elephant's Ear" proper. Just / after noon on 11 March one troop was brought under small arms, / automatic weapons, RPG2, and recoilless rifle fire from an estimated / Viet Cong company at six kilometers northwest of Lo Go and within 200 / meters of the Cambodian border. The enemy was in well-prepared / positions with fortified bunkers and an extensive trench system. As / friendly fires and air strikes increased, the Viet Cong were trapped / on the near bank of the river which marks the border at this point; / heli-copter gunships kept the river under surveillance to prevent / escape into Cambodia. During the night the position was kept under / con-tinuous illumination by flareships and under artillery and / mini-gun fire from the flareships. However, the enemy slipped away / during the night, leaving twenty-eight dead behind. The reason for the / stiff resistance became readily apparent the next morning. Located in / reinforced concrete bunkers fifteen feet underground were two large, / electrically powered Chinese printing presses weighing nearly a ton / each. Manufactured in Shanghai in 1965, each press had an hourly / output of 5,000 printed sheets measuring 17 by 24 inches; the presses / also had cutting and folding attach-ments. A further search yielded / several barrels of lead printer's type as well as thirty-one / individual weapons. The presses were airlifted to the 25th Division's / base camp. Indications were that the presses were being utilized by / the COSVN propaganda and cultural indoctrination section. / The Phase I operations started to wind down / beginning 12 March. On the 14th the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, turned / over responsibility for the security of Prek Klok Special Forces Camp, / the old French Fort, and Route 4 to the 196th Brigade. Colonel Marks / commenced repositioning his forces and prepared to relieve the / division's 2d Brigade of its Revolutionary Development mission so the / brigade could participate in JUNCTION CITY II. On 15 March the 173d / left the operational area and reverted to control of II Field Force; / on the same day the 11th Cavalry (-) terminated its participation. At / midnight on 17 March Phase I officially came to a close. The enemy had / lost 835 killed, 15 captured, 264 weapons, and enormous quantities of / supplies and equipment. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // The stage was now set for Operation ATTLEBORO. / ATTLEBORO was to be a search and destroy operation conducted by the / 196th Light Infantry Brigade in an area generally described as a / rectangle twenty kilometers wide by sixty kilometers long located east / and north of Tay Ninh city. (Map 4) The operation was initiated by the / 196th on 14 September 1966 with the airmobile assault of a single / battalion followed by a search and destroy operation of but a few days / in which only two significant contacts with the enemy were made. After / the initial assault battalion was committed elsewhere, another / battalion of the 196th continued the mission from 18 to 24 September; / it made no significant contact. It, too, was diverted to another area / but returned to ATTLEBORO on 6 October and conducted search and / destroy operations for ten more days. During this time the battalion / destroyed tunnel complexes, trenches, and fighting positions and / captured two tons of rice, many documents, and some enemy arms. It was / not until mid-October, as the result of a decision taken at the / Military Assistance Command commanders' conference, that ATTLEBORO was / expanded to a multibattalion operation with the 196th committing two / battalions to its search and destroy activities. Through the end of / October action was light and sporadic with no major contact. In fact, / the action was so light that between 4 October and 1 November only two / immediate air strikes were called in to support the operation. / Meanwhile, the Viet Cong 9th Division was starting to stir again. / After its beating in EL PASO II in June and July 1966, the 9th / had withdrawn to its sanctuaries deep in War Zone C next to the / Cambodian border and had retrained, re-equipped, and absorbed / replacements. The plan of the 9th was to use these bases to launch a / winter offensive against objectives in Tay Ninh Province. Among its / objectives was to be the Special Forces camp at Suoi Da, located / twelve kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh city in the shadow of Nui Ba / Den, the Black Virgin Mountain, which rose, as if by mistake, some / three thousand feet above the surrounding plain. The division also / hoped to lure some allied forces into the area in response to an / attack by one of its regiments so that these forces might be ambushed / by the remaining regiments of the 9th. By late October the regiments / assigned to the 9th Viet Cong Division- the 271st, 272d, 273d, and the / 101st North Vietnamese Regiment- had commenced deploying in War Zone / C. On 28 October elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division made / contact with a battalion of the 273d just east of the ATTLEBORO / operational area. The commanding officer of one of the companies of / the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment, captured on 8 November, / revealed that his regiment had left its base area on the Cambodian / border about 1 November to move south along the eastern boundary of / the ATTLEBORO area toward resupply camps. / Sweeping operations by American units near Dau Tieng on 31 October / uncovered a major enemy supply base. On 1 November ATTLEBORO became a / brigade-size operation with the 196th Brigade assuming operational / control of a battalion from the 25th Division. Two days later an / airmobile assault by this battalion made contact with elements of the / 9th Viet Cong Division; on the same day, 3 November, elements of the / U.S. 5th Special Forces Group's mobile strike force, which had been / inserted into landing zones near Suoi Da, were also engaged by forces / of the 9th Division. Operation ATTLEBORO was about to erupt. / By 5 November it was apparent that a very large enemy force was / involved; operational control was initially passed to Major General / William E. DePuy, Commanding General, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and / subsequently to the commanding general of II Field Force. Before the / operation ended on 24 November, the 1st Division, elements of the U.S. / 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and / several South Vietnamese Army battalions were committed to it, over / 22,000 U.S. and allied troops in all. It was the largest U.S. / operation of the war to that time. / It was not only the number of U.S. and allied troops eventually / involved which made ATTLEBORO a large operation. There was also during / November a total of over 1,600 close air support sorties flown, / expending nearly 12,000 tons of ordnance (225 were B-52 / sorties carrying 4,000 tons). Cargo aircraft flew 3,300 sorties in / transporting 8,900 tons of cargo and 11,500 passengers during the / period 18 October-26 November. The enemy left 1,106 dead on the / battlefield and had 44 captured. (Friendly losses were 155 killed and / 494 wounded.) Later military intelligence reports confirmed the high / casualties sustained by the enemy, listing 2,130 killed- including / over 1,000 by air strikes, almost 900 wounded, and over 200 missing or / captured. Headquarters of the Central Office of South Vietnam was / reported struck by B-52 bombers on more than one occasion with the / destruction of great quantities of supplies, equipment, and documents. / Four Viet Cong battalion commanders and 5 company commanders were / reported killed in the operation. / Not only would its casualities pose a serious problem to the Viet Cong / 9th Division, so too would the pillaging of its depot area by U.S. and / South Vietnamese forces. Over 2,000 tons of rice were captured, as / were many tons of salt, 19,000 grenades, 500 claymore mines, and many / individual and crew-served weapons. Uncovered and destroyed were / regimental and battalion headquarters sites, a mine factory, and a / vast tunnel complex containing immense quantities of supplies ranging / from bolts of cloth to weighing scales. As General DePuy commented, / "It is the largest haul we've made." / Hurting from the whipping it had taken, the 9th Division once again / disappeared into its sanctuaries to lick its wounds, regroup, and / reorganize. It would not be seen on the field of combat again until / the spring of 1967. / Operation ATTLEBORO introduced the large-scale, multiorganization / operation to the war, albeit as an accident, in response to the Viet / Cong 9th Division's Tay Ninh campaign. But ATTLEBORO proved that, / within a matter of hours, well-trained and profes-sionally led / organizations with proper logistic support could deploy large numbers / of battalions to an active operational area and commit those / battalions to immediate combat against a highly disciplined enemy. It / proved that large-scale operations, perhaps involving the majority of / the forces available in corps zone, have a place in modern / counterinsurgency warfare and can effectively destroy large enemy / forces and equipment and neutralize major base areas. However, the / next time such large forces were used in a single operation, it would / not be by accident, as CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY were soon to / verify. / / / D-Day, 22 February 1967 / On D-day the operation order was implemented as envisaged. Nine / infantry battalions conducted air assaults (eight airmobile, one / parachute) to cordon the entire northern portion of the objective / area. At the same time, the 25th Division adjusted its one brigade in / blocking positions on the west while positioning additional units for / the attack into the horseshoe; the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, pushed- / north up Provincial Route 4 to complete the horseshoe. / The 1st Brigade, 1st Division, initiated the airmobile operations from / Minh Thanh with one battalion making an airmobile assault at 0813 into / a landing zone north of Route 246 and only 1,600 meters south of the / Cambodian border. Sporadic small arms fire was encountered from the / southern portion of the landing zone; however, the zone was quickly / secured. The other two battalions of the brigade air assaulted into / LZ's to the west of the first battalion at 1130 and 1630. They were / unopposed. / Earlier that day, 845 paratroopers had boarded sixteen C-130's at Bien /